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Abstract 
In a modern OS, kernel modules often use spinlocks and 
interrupt handlers to monopolize a CPU core to execute 
concurrent code in atomic context. In this situation, if 
the kernel module performs an operation that can sleep 
at runtime, a system hang may occur. We refer to this 
kind of concurrency bug as a sleep-in-atomic-context 
(SAC) bug. In practice, SAC bugs have received insuf-
ficient attention and are hard to find, as they do not al-
ways cause problems in real executions.  
In this paper, we propose a practical static approach 
named DSAC, to effectively detect SAC bugs and au-
tomatically recommend patches to help fix them. DSAC 
uses four key techniques: (1) a hybrid of flow-sensitive 
and -insensitive analysis to perform accurate and effi-
cient code analysis; (2) a heuristics-based method to 
accurately extract kernel interfaces that can sleep at 
runtime; (3) a path-check method to effectively filter 
out repeated reports and false bugs; (4) a pattern-based 
method to automatically generate recommended patches 
to help fix the bugs.  
We evaluate DSAC on kernel modules (drivers, file 
systems, and network modules) of the Linux kernel, and 
on the FreeBSD and NetBSD kernels, and in total find 
401 new real bugs. 272 of these bugs have been con-
firmed by the relevant kernel maintainers, and 43 patch-
es generated by DSAC have been applied by kernel 
maintainers. 
1. Introduction 
Concurrency bugs are known to be difficult to debug. 
Many tools have been proposed to detect common con-
currency bugs such as atomicity violations and data 
races. However, as a kind of concurrency bug, sleep-in-
atomic-context (SAC) bugs have received less attention. 
SAC bugs occur at the kernel level when a sleeping 
operation is performed in atomic context [10], such as 
when holding a spinlock or executing an interrupt han-
dler. Code executing in atomic context monopolizes a 
CPU core, and the progress of other threads that need to 
concurrently access the same resources is delayed. Thus 
the code execution in atomic context should complete 
as quickly as possible. Sleeping in atomic context is 
forbidden, as it can block a CPU core for a long period 
and may lead to a system hang. 
Even though sleeping in atomic context is forbidden, 
many SAC bugs still exist, especially in kernel modules, 
such as device drivers and file systems. The main rea-
sons why SAC bugs continue to occur include: (1) De-
termining whether an operation can sleep often requires 
system-specific experience; (2) Testing kernel modules 
can be difficult, for example, running a device driver 
requires its associated device; (3) SAC bugs do not al-
ways cause problems in real execution, and they are 
often hard to reproduce at runtime. Recent studies [12, 
48] have shown that SAC bugs have caused serious 
system hangs at runtime. Thus, it is necessary to detect 
and fix SAC bugs in kernel modules. 
Many existing approaches [7, 19, 28, 42] can detect 
concurrency bugs, but most of them are designed for 
user-level applications. Some approaches [13, 17, 18, 
41, 44] can detect some common kinds of kernel-level 
concurrency bugs, such as atomicity violations and data 
races, but they have not addressed SAC bugs. Several 
approaches [2, 9, 16, 34, 53] can detect common kinds 
of OS kernel faults, including SAC bugs. But they are 
not specific to SAC bugs, and most of them [9, 16, 34] 
are designed to collect statistics rather than report spe-
cific bugs to the user, making issues such as detection 
time and false positive rate less important. 
In this paper, we propose a static approach named 
DSAC
1
 that targets accurately and efficiently detecting 
SAC (sleep-in-atomic-context) bugs in kernel modules, 
and can automatically recommend patches to help fix 
the detected bugs. DSAC consists of four phases. Firstly, 
DSAC uses a hybrid of flow-sensitive and -insensitive 
analysis (subsequently referred to as a hybrid flow 
analysis) to analyze the source code, in order to collect 
the set of functions that are possibly called in atomic 
context. Secondly, from the collected functions, DSAC 
exploits a heuristics-based method, which uses some 
heuristics based on the analysis of the call graphs and 
comments of the kernel code, to extract kernel interfac-
es that can sleep at runtime. Thirdly, with the extracted 
                                                                                             
1 DSAC website: http://oslab.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/DSAC/index.html 
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sleep-able kernel interfaces, DSAC first reuses the hy-
brid flow analysis to detect possible bugs, and then uses 
a path-check method to filter out repeated reports and 
false bugs by validating the code path of each detected 
bug. Finally, DSAC exploits a pattern-based method to 
automatically generate patches to help fix the bugs. This 
method analyzes the bug reports generated in the previ-
ous phase, and uses common fixing patterns to correct 
the buggy code. 
We have implemented DSAC using LLVM [51]. To 
validate its effectiveness, we first evaluate DSAC on 
Linux drivers, which are typical of modules in the Linux 
kernel. To validate the generality and portability, we 
then use DSAC to check file systems and network mod-
ules in the Linux kernel, and finally use DSAC in 
FreeBSD and NetBSD to check their kernel source code. 
The results show that DSAC can indeed accurately and 
efficiently find real SAC bugs and recommend a num-
ber of correct patches to help fix the bugs. 
DSAC has four main advantages in practical use: 
1) Efficient and accurate code analysis. DSAC uses 
an efficient inter-procedural and context-sensitive anal-
ysis to maintain a lock stack across function calls, which 
can accurately identify the code in atomic context. All 
source files of the kernel module are analyzed at once to 
perform accurate analysis across function calls. 
2) Precise and detailed bug reports. To achieve pre-
cise bug detection, DSAC uses a heuristics-based meth-
od to extract sleep-able kernel interfaces, and uses a 
path-check method to filter out repeated reports and 
false bugs. It also produces detailed reports of the found 
bugs, including code paths and source file names, for 
the user to locate and check. 
3) Recommended patch generation. With the gener-
ated bug reports, DSAC uses a pattern-based method to 
automatically generate patches to help fix the detected 
bugs, which can reduce the manual work of bug fixing. 
4) High automation, generality and portability. 
Once the user offers the names of spin-lock and -unlock 
functions, interrupt-handler-register functions and basic 
sleep-able kernel interfaces, the remaining phases of 
DSAC are fully automated. DSAC can effectively check 
kernel modules, including drivers, file systems and net-
work modules. And it can also be easily ported in an-
other OS to check the kernel code. 
In this paper, we make three main contributions: 
 We first analyze the challenges in detecting SAC 
bugs in kernel modules, and then propose four key 
techniques to address these challenges: (1) a hybrid 
flow analysis to perform accurate and efficient code 
analysis; (2) a heuristics-based method to accurate-
ly extract sleep-able kernel interfaces in the ana-
lyzed kernel modules; (3) a path-check method to 
effectively filter out repeated reports and false bugs; 
(4) a pattern-based method to automatically gener-
ate recommended patches to help fix the bugs. 
 Based on the four techniques, we propose a practi-
cal approach named DSAC, to accurately and effi-
ciently detect SAC bugs in kernel modules and au-
tomatically recommend patches to help fix the bugs. 
 We evaluate DSAC on drivers in Linux 3.17.2 and 
4.11.1. We select these kernel versions as they are 
near the beginning of stable series, and thus the 
simplest bugs should have been fixed in them. We 
find 200 and 320 real bugs respectively in these 
versions. 50 real bugs in 3.17.2 have been fixed in 
4.11.1, and 209 real bugs in 4.11.1 have been con-
firmed by kernel maintainers. To validate the gen-
erality and portability, we use DSAC to check file 
systems and network modules in the Linux kernel, 
and then run it in FreeBSD 11.0 and NetBSD 7.1 to 
check their kernel code, and find 81 new real bugs. 
43 generated patches for the three OS kernels have 
been applied by kernel maintainers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the background. Section 3 presents 
the challenges and our techniques. Section 4 introduces 
DSAC in detail. Section 5 presents the evaluation. Sec-
tion 6 compares DSAC to previous approaches. Section 
7 presents limitations and future work. Section 8 gives 
the related work. Section 9 concludes this paper. 
2. Background 
In this section, we first introduce atomic context, and 
then motivate our work by an example of a real SAC 
bug in a Linux driver. 
2.1 Atomic Context 
Atomic context is an OS kernel state that a CPU core is 
monopolized to execute the code, and the progress of 
other threads that need to concurrently access the same 
resources is delayed. This context can protect resources 
from concurrent access, in which the code execution 
should complete as quickly as possible without able to 
be rescheduled. Due to this special situation, sleeping in 
atomic context is forbidden, as it can block CPU cores 
for long periods and may lead to a system hang. 
There are two common examples of atomic context in 
the kernel, namely holding a spinlock and executing an 
interrupt handler. If a thread sleeps when holding a 
spinlock, another thread that requests the same spinlock 
will spin on a CPU core to wait until the former thread 
releases the spinlock. If threads spin on all CPU cores 
like this, no CPU core will be available for the former 
thread to release the spinlock, causing a deadlock [11]. 
If an interrupt handler sleeps, the kernel scheduler can-
not reschedule it and a system hang may occur, as the 
interrupt handler is not backed by a process [29]. 
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Note that atomic context only occurs at the kernel 
level, as user-level applications are regularly interrupted 
by the OS scheduler when their time slices end. Though 
kernel developers often know that sleeping is not al-
lowed in atomic context, many SAC bugs still exist [16, 
34], especially in kernel modules. 
2.2 Motivating Example 
We motivate our work by a real bug in the usb_gadget 
that persisted over 8 releases (1.5 years) from Linux 
2.6.38 to Linux 3.7. Figure 1 presents part of the source 
code for the driver. The function mv_ep_queue calls 
spin_lock_irqsave to take a spinlock (line 774) and then 
calls req_to_dtd (line 775). The function req_to_dtd 
calls build_dtd (line 452), which calls dma_pool_alloc 
with GFP_KERNEL to request a DMA memory pool 
(line 399). According to the kernel documentation [50], 
dma_pool_alloc called with GFP_KERNEL can sleep, 
thus a SAC bug exists. This bug was first fixed in Linux 
3.7, by replacing GFP_KERNEL with GFP_ATOMIC, 
which indicates to dma_pool_alloc that it cannot sleep. 
This example illustrates three main reasons why SAC 
bugs occur in kernel modules. (1) Determining whether 
an operation can sleep requires OS-specific knowledge. 
In this example, without experience in Linux kernel 
development, it may be hard to know that the function 
dma_pool_alloc called with GFP_KERNEL can sleep at 
runtime. (2) SAC bugs do not always cause problems in 
real execution and are hard to reproduce at runtime. In 
this example, the function dma_pool_alloc called with 
GFP_KERNEL only sleeps when memory is insufficient. 
Even in a low-memory situation, this SAC bug is not 
always triggered at runtime in a multi-core system, be-
cause of the non-determinism of concurrent execution. 
(3) Multiple layers of function calls need to be consid-
ered when finding SAC bugs. In this example, the func-
tion dma_pool_alloc is called across two function levels 
after spin_lock_irqsave is called. 
The bug in Figure 1 has been fixed, but many SAC 
bugs still remain in current kernel modules. Some recent 
studies [12, 48] have shown that SAC bugs have caused 
serious system hangs, and these bugs were often hard to 
locate and reproduce. Thus, to improve the reliability of 
the operating system, it is necessary to design an ap-
proach to detect SAC bugs in kernel modules. 
3. Challenges and Techniques 
In this section, we first discuss the main challenges in 
detecting SAC bugs and then propose our techniques to 
address these challenges. 
3.1 Challenges and Overview of Our Solutions 
There are four main challenges in detecting SAC bugs 
in kernel modules: 
C1: Code analysis coverage, accuracy and time. A key 
goal in bug detection is to efficiently cover more code 
and generate accurate results. Running kernel modules 
can be difficult (for example, running a driver needs the 
associated device), and thus we use static analysis to 
achieve high code coverage without the need to execute 
the code. Static analysis can be either flow-sensitive or 
flow-insensitive. Flow-sensitive analysis searches each 
code path of a branch and can cover all code paths. For 
this reason, it can produce accurate results, but it often 
requires much time and memory especially in inter-
procedural analysis. Flow-insensitive analysis handles 
each code line instead of each path. Thus, it is more 
efficient, but its results may be less accurate. We pro-
pose a hybrid flow analysis to obtain the advantages of 
both flow-sensitive and -insensitive analysis. It uses 
flow-sensitive analysis when its accuracy is expected to 
be beneficial and falls back to flow-insensitive analysis 
when full accuracy is not necessary. We will introduce 
the hybrid flow analysis in Section 3.2.1. 
C2: Sleep-able function extraction. Determining wheth-
er a function can sleep often requires a good under-
standing of the kernel code. Specifically, for a function 
defined in the kernel module (referred to as a module 
function subsequently), whether it can sleep depends on 
whether the called kernel interfaces can sleep. Using 
this idea, we design a heuristics-based method that first 
collects all kernel interfaces possibly called in atomic 
context of the kernel module, and then analyzes the 
kernel source code and comments to identify sleep-able 
ones. We will introduce this method in Section 3.2.2. 
C3: Filtering out repeated and false bugs. Some detect-
ed bugs may be repeated, because they take the spinlock 
at the same place and call the same sleep-able function, 
but only differ in their code paths. Moreover, some de-
tected bugs may be false positives, as the analysis does 
not consider variable value information, and thus may 
search some infeasible code paths. We design a path-
check method that checks the code path of each detect-
ed bug to filter out repeated reports and false bugs. We 









Figure 1: Part of the usb_gadget driver code in Linux 2.6.38. 
 
FILE: linux-2.6.38/drivers/usb/gadget/mv_udc_core.c 
382. static struct mv_dtd *build_dtd(…) { 
           …… 
399.     dtd = dma_pool_alloc(udc->dta_pool, GFP_KERNEL, dma); 
           …… 
438. } 
 
441. static int req_to_dtd(…) { 
           …… 
452.     dtd = build_dtd(…); 
           …… 
473. } 
 
724. static int mv_ep_queue(…) { 
           …… 
774.     spin_lock_irq_save(…); 
775.     req_to_dtd(…); 
           …… 
799. } 
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HanCall(mycall, path_stack, lock_stack) 
1: if  lock_stack == ø  and  g_intr_flag == FALSE  then 
2:       return; 
3: end if 
4: if  PathHasExisted(mycall, path_stack) == TRUE  then 
5:       return; 
6: end if 
7: AddPathStack(mycall, path_stack); 
8: myfunc := GetCalledFunction(mycall); 
9: HowToFunc(myfunc, path_stack, lock_stack, g_intr_flag);  
10: if  IsModuleFunc(myfunc) == FALSE  then 
11: return; 
12: end if 
13: if  IsTargetFunc(myfunc) == TRUE  or  g_intr_flag == TRUE  then 
14: entry_block := GetEntryBlock(myfunc); 
15: HanBlock(entry_block, path_stack, lock_stack); 
16: else 
17: foreach  call  in  FunctionCallList(myfunc)  do 
18: HanCall(call, path_stack, lock_stack); 
19: end foreach 
20: end if 
 
HanBlock(myblock, path_stack, lock_stack) 
1: if  PathHasExisted(myblock, path_stack) == TRUE  then 
2:       return; 
3: end if 
4: AddPathStack(myblock, path_stack); 
5: foreach  func_call  in  FunctionCallList(myblock)  do 
6: if  func_call is a call to a spin-lock function  then 
7 Push func_call onto lock_stack; 
8: else if  func_call is a call to a spin-unlock function  then 
9: Pop an item from lock_stack; 
10: else 
11: HanCall(func_call, path_stack, lock_stack); 
12: end if 
13: end foreach 
14: if  lock_stack == ø  and  g_intr_flag == FALSE  then 
15: return; 
16: end if 
17: foreach  block  in  SuccessorBlocks(myblock)  do 
18: HanBlock(block, path_stack, lock_stack); 
19: end foreach 
 
FlowAnalysis: Main hybrid flow analysis 
1: foreach  func  in  target_func_set  do 
2: lock_block_set := GetLockBlockSet(func); 
3 foreach  block  in  lock_block_set  do 
4: path_stack := ø; lock_stack := ø; g_intr_flag := FALSE; 
5: HanBlock(block, path_stack, lock_stack); 
6: end foreach 
7: end foreach 
8: foreach  func  in  intr_handler_func_set  do 
9: path_stack := ø; lock_stack := ø; g_intr_flag := TRUE; 
10: entry_block := GetEntryBlock(func); 
11: HanBlock(entry_block, path_stack, lock_stack); 
12: end foreach 
Figure 2: Hybrid flow analysis. 
 
C4: Bug fixing recommendation. After finding real bugs, 
the user may manually write patches to fix them. Be-
sides, incorrect patches can introduce new bugs [21]. 
To reduce the manual work of bug fixing, we summa-
rize common patterns for fixing SAC bugs, and propose 
a pattern-based method to automatically generate rec-
ommended patches to help fix the bugs. We will intro-
duce this method in Section 3.2.4. 
3.2 Key Techniques 
3.2.1 Hybrid Flow Analysis 
Our hybrid flow analysis is used to identify the code in 
atomic context. It is based on two points: (1) The analy-
sis is context-sensitive and inter-procedural, in order to 
maintain the spinlock status and detect atomic context 
across functions calls. (2) The choice of flow-sensitive 
or -insensitive analysis is made as follows: if a module 
function calls a spin-lock or spin-unlock function (this 
module function is referred to as a target function) or it 
is called by an interrupt handler, flow-sensitive analy-
sis is used to analyze each code path from the entry 
basic block; otherwise, flow-insensitive analysis is used 
to handle each function call made by the function. In 
the first case, flow-sensitive analysis is used to accurate-
ly maintain the spinlock status and collect code paths 
for subsequent bug filtering. In the second case, flow-
insensitive analysis is used to reduce analysis cost, be-
cause in this case, the spinlock status is expected not to 
change explicitly. 
Our hybrid flow analysis has two steps. The first step 
identifies target functions and interrupt handler func-
tions, as flow-sensitive analysis is performed in these 
functions. For target functions, we analyze the defini-
tion of each module function and check whether it calls 
a spin-lock or spin-unlock function. For interrupt han-
dler functions, we identify the calls to interrupt-handler-
register kernel interfaces (like request_irq in the Linux 
kernel), and extract interrupt handler functions from the 
related arguments. 
The second step performs the main analysis. Figure 2 
presents the procedure FlowAnalysis. It maintains two 
stacks, namely a path stack (path_stack) to store the 
executed code path and a lock stack (lock_stack) to 
store the spinlock status. A flag (g_intr_flag) is used to 
indicate whether the code is in an interrupt handler. If 
lock_stack is not empty or g_intr_flag is TRUE, the 
code is in atomic context. FlowAnalysis uses HanCall 
to handle a function call and HanBlock to handle a 
basic block. We introduce them as follows: 
HanCall. It handles the function call mycall with the 
arguments path_stack and lock_stack, to check if the 
definition of the function called by mycall needs to be 
handled, and if so to determine if the flow-sensitive or -
insensitive analysis should be used. Firstly, HanCall 
checks if lock_stack is empty and g_intr_flag is FALSE 
(lines 1-3). If so, no spinlock is held and the code is not 
in an interrupt handler, and thus HanCall returns. Sec-
ondly, HanCall uses path_stack to check if mycall has 
been analyzed (lines 4-6). If so, it returns to avoid re-
peated analysis. Note that this prevents infinite looping 
on recursive calls. Thirdly, HanCall adds mycall into 
path_stack, and gets the called function myfunc (lines 7-
8). Fourthly, HowToFunc (line 9) performs the analyses 
presented in Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.3. Fifthly, HanCall 
checks if myfunc is a module function (lines 10-12). If 
not, it returns. Finally, it handles the definition of my-
func (lines 13-20). If myfunc is a target function or 
g_intr_flag is TRUE, flow-sensitive analysis is used to 
handle its entry basic block using HanBlock (lines 13-
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15); otherwise, flow-insensitive analysis is used to han-
dle each function call made by myfunc using HanCall 
(lines 16-20). 
HanBlock. It handles the basic block myblock with the 
arguments path_stack and lock_stack, to perform flow-
sensitive analysis as well as maintain the spinlock status. 
Firstly, HanBlock uses path_stack to check if myblock 
has been analyzed (lines 1-3). If so, it returns to avoid 
repeated analysis. Secondly, HanBlock adds myblock 
into path_stack (line 4). Thirdly, HanBlock handles 
each function call in myblock (lines 5-13). If the func-
tion call is a call to a spin-lock or spin-unlock function, 
HanBlock pushes the call onto or pops an item from 
lock_stack; otherwise, the call is handled by HanCall. 
Fourthly, HanBlock checks if lock_stack is empty and 
g_intr_flag is FALSE. If so, it returns (lines 14-16); 
otherwise, each successive basic block of myblock is 
handled using HanBlock (lines 17-19). 
FlowAnalysis. It performs the main analysis, in two 
steps. Firstly, each target function is analyzed (line 1-7). 
For a target function, each basic block that contains a 
spin-lock function call is an analysis entry. In this case, 
path_stack and lock_stack are first set to empty, and 
g_intr_flag is set to FALSE. Then, the analysis is started 
by using HanBlock to handle this basic block. Secondly, 
each interrupt handler function is analyzed (line 8-12). 
In this case, path_stack and lock_stack are set to empty, 
but g_intr_flag is set to TRUE. Then, the analysis is 
started by using HanBlock to handle the entry basic 
block of the interrupt handler function. 
Our hybrid flow analysis has three main advantages: 
(1) The functions that are possibly called in atomic con-
text can be accurately detected; (2) Detailed code paths 
and complete spinlock status are maintained, to help 
accurately detect atomic context; (3) Many unnecessary 
paths are not considered to reduce the analysis time. 
However, a main limitation of our analysis is that varia-
ble value information is not considered, which may 
cause false positives in bug detection. 
We illustrate our hybrid flow analysis using some 
simplified driver-like code shown in Figure 3. As shown 
in Figure 3(a), the module consists of MyFunc, FuncA 
and FuncB, where MyFunc calls FuncA and FuncB. 
Because MyFunc and FuncB both call spin_lock and 
spin_unlock, they are target functions and handled by 
the flow-sensitive analysis; because FuncA does not call 
spin-lock or spin-unlock functions, it is handled by the 
flow-insensitive analysis. Figure 3(b) presents the call 
path of each function, with the code line numbers from 
Figure 3(a) shown in the vertices. Figure 3(c) shows the 
call paths used in inter-procedural analysis of MyFunc. 
During the analysis, no spinlock is held after the first 
line of FuncB (line 24), thus the following call paths in 
FuncB are not analyzed. In total, only two useful call 
paths marked in solid edges in Figure 3(c) are handled 
when analyzing MyFunc, and they are the only neces-
sary call paths for atomic context analysis in this case. 
3.2.2 Heuristics-Based Sleep-able Function Extraction 
We use some heuristics to accurately extract sleep-able 
kernel interfaces in the kernel modules. Firstly, we per-
form our hybrid flow analysis on the analyzed kernel 
module(s), to collect all kernel interfaces that are possi-
bly called in atomic context, through HowToFunc in 
Figure 2. The collected information is stored into a da-
tabase as intermediate results, including the function 
name, constant arguments, file name and so on. Second-
ly, we use some heuristics to inter-procedurally analyze 
the call graph of each collected kernel interface, and 
determine whether it can sleep. If a kernel interface 
satisfies one of the five criteria, we identify it sleep-able: 
 It calls a basic sleep-able function, like schedule in 
the Linux kernel and sleep in the NetBSD kernel. 
 It is called with a specific constant argument indi-
cating it can sleep, like GFP_KERNEL in the Linux 
kernel and M_WAITOK in the FreeBSD kernel. 
 It calls a specific macro that indicates the operation 
can sleep, like might_sleep in the Linux kernel. 
 The comments in or before it contain keywords like 
“can sleep” and “may block”. 
 It calls an already identified sleep-able kernel inter-
face in the call graph. 
To avoid repeated checking, we maintain two cache 
lists. If a function is marked as sleep-able, it is added to 
a sleep-able list; otherwise it is added to a non-sleep list. 
When analyzing a function, we first check whether the 
function is in either of these lists. 
After the extraction, we get the sleep-able kernel in-
terfaces that are possibly called in atomic context of the 
analyzed kernel modules(s). These kernel interfaces can 














(a)                                  (b)                    (c) 
Figure 3: Example of hybrid flow analysis. 
1: int FuncA(device *dev); 
2: void FuncB(device *dev); 
3: 
4: void MyFunc(device *dev) { 
5:     spin_lock(dev->lock); 
6:     if (FuncA(dev)) 
7:         goto exit; 
8:     FuncB(dev); 
9: exit: 
10:     spin_unlock(dev->lock); 
11: } 
12: 
13: int FuncA(device *dev) { 
14:     int v = reg_read(dev->reg, 0x01); 
15:     if (!v) { 
16:         printk(“REG data error!\n”); 
17:         return -EIO; 
18:     } 
19:     msleep(1); 
20:     return 0; 
21: } 
22: 
23: void FuncB(device *dev) { 
24:     spin_unlock(dev->lock); 
25:     if (!dev->reply_msg) 
26:         printk(“No reply, wait!\n”); 
27:     msleep(10); 

















































(b) Checking the return value of a kernel interface 
Figure 4: Examples of path checks in drivers. 
 
FILE: linux-4.11.1/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c 
504. static int ufshcd_wait_for_register(…, bool can_sleep) { 
           …… 
515.     if (can_sleep) 
516.         usleep_range(…); 
517.     else 




783. static void DAC960_ExecuteCommand(…) { 
…… 
794.     if (in_interrupt()) 
795.         return; 
796.     wait_for_completion(…); 
797. } 
 
3.2.3 Path-Check Bug Filtering 
We use the detailed code paths recorded in our hybrid 
flow analysis to filter out repeated and false SAC bugs. 
Firstly, we filter out repeated bugs. For each new pos-
sible bug, we check whether its entry and terminal basic 
blocks are the same as those of an already detected bug, 
and whether they call the same sleep-able kernel inter-
face. If both conditions are satisfied, this possible bug is 
marked as a repeated bug and is filtered out. 
Secondly, we filter out false bugs, which are mainly 
introduced by the fact that our hybrid flow analysis ne-
glects variable value information. The best strategy is to 
validate path conditions [6]. But it is often hard to en-
sure the accuracy and efficiency when control flow is 
complex, especially across function calls. 
By studying the Linux kernel source code, we find a 
useful and common semantic information for variables: 
a conditional that checks a parameter of the containing 
function or the return value of a specific kernel inter-
face is often used to decide whether sleeping is allowed. 
Figure 4 presents two examples in Linux driver code. In 
Figure 4(a), a conditional checks the function parameter 
can_sleep to decide whether the sleep-able kernel inter-
face usleep_range can be called. In Figure 4(b), a con-
ditional checks the return value of the kernel interface 
in_interrupt to check whether the code is executed in an 
interrupt handler to decide whether the sleep-able kernel 
interface wait_for_completion can be called. Using this 
semantic information, we design a straightforward strat-
egy to cover common cases. If the code path of a possi-
ble bug satisfies one of the two criteria, we mark this 
bug as a false bug and filter it out: 
 The path contains a conditional that checks a pa-
rameter of the containing function, and the name of 
this parameter contains a keyword like “can_sleep”, 
“atomic” and “can_block”. 
 The path contains a conditional that checks the re-
turn value of a kernel interface used to check atom-
ic context, like in_interrupt in the Linux kernel. 
We propose a path-check method that uses the above 
steps, to automatically and effectively filter out repeated 
reports and false bugs. 
3.2.4 Pattern-based Patch Generation 
By studying Linux kernel patches, we have found four 
common patterns of fixing SAC bugs: 
P1: Replace the sleep-able kernel interface with a non-
sleep kernel interface having the same functionality, like 
usleep_range ⇒ udelay in Figure 4(a). 
P2: Replace the specific sleep-able constant flag with a 
non-sleep flag, like GFP_KERNEL ⇒ GFP_ATOMIC 
in Figure 1. 
P3: Move the sleep-able kernel interface to some place 
where a spinlock is not held. 
P4: Replace the spinlock with a lock that allows sleep-
ing, like spin_lock ⇒ mutex_lock and spin_unlock ⇒ 
mutex_unlock in the Linux kernel. 
These patterns have different usage scenarios and 
raise different challenges. Firstly, P1 and P2 can be 
used for all atomic contexts, while P3 and P4 are only 
used when holding a spinlock. Secondly, P1 and P2 
involve simple modifications, while P3 and P4 involve 
more difficult modifications and are error-prone. Using 
P3 requires carefully determining where the sleep-able 
function should be moved to. Using P4 requires modify-
ing all locking and unlocking operations. Thus, using 
P3 and P4 to automatically generate patches is hard. 
We only use P1 and P2 to automatically generate rec-
ommended patches, because these patterns are simple 
and effective. Supporting P3 and P4 is left as future 
work. The method has three steps. Firstly, the bug is 
located using its code path, and the relevant fixing pat-
tern (P1 or P2) is selected according to the code. If no 
relevant pattern is available, no patch is generated. Sec-
ondly, the buggy code is corrected by using the selected 
pattern. Finally, a patch is generated by comparing the 
corrected code to original code. 
This pattern-based method has two advantages. First-
ly, it can reduce the manual work of bug fixing. Second-
ly, by using common fixing patterns, it can ensure the 
correctness of the generated patches. 
4. Approach 
Based on the four techniques in Section 3.2, we propose 
a static approach DSAC, to effectively detect SAC bugs 
in kernel modules and recommend patches to help fix 
the detected bugs. We have implemented DSAC with 
the Clang compiler [49], and perform static analysis on 
the LLVM bytecode of the kernel module. Figure 5 
presents the architecture of DSAC, which has five parts: 
 Code compiler. For a given kernel module, this part 
compiles all the source files of the kernel module 
into a single LLVM bytecode file. 
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 Function extractor. With the LLVM bytecode and 
the kernel source code, this part uses our hybrid 
flow analysis and heuristics-based method to gen-
erate intermediate results and extract sleep-able 
kernel interfaces called in the kernel module(s). 
 Bug detector. With the extracted sleep-able kernel 
interfaces and intermediate results, this part reuses 
our hybrid flow analysis to automatically detect 
possible SAC bugs from the LLVM bytecode. 
 Bug filter. This part uses our path-check method to 
filter out repeated and false bugs and generates re-
ports for the final detected SAC bugs. 
 Patch generator. With the bug code paths and ker-
nel module source code, this part uses our pattern-
based method to automatically recommend patches 
to help fix the bugs. 
Based on the architecture, DSAC consists of four 
phases which are introduced as follows. 
4.1 Function Information Collection 
In this phase, DSAC performs two steps: 
Firstly, the code compiler compiles each source file 
of the kernel module into a LLVM bytecode file, and 
then links all bytecode files into a single bytecode file. 
This single bytecode file includes all module function 
definitions, thus all analyses of the kernel module can 
be directly performed on only this single bytecode file. 
Secondly, the function extractor performs the hybrid 
flow analysis to collect the information about functions 
that are possibly called when holding a spinlock or in an 
interrupt handler. The information is stored in a MySQL 
[52] database as the intermediate results, including the 
function name, constant arguments, file name, etc. The 
intermediate results will be later used in sleep-able ker-
nel interface extraction and bug detection. 
4.2 Sleep-able Kernel Interface Extraction 
In this phase, the function extractor first extracts func-
tion call graphs of kernel interfaces and comments of 
these kernel interfaces, and then uses the heuristics-
based method to extract sleep-able kernel interfaces. 
The user can check and modify the extracted sleep-able 
kernel interfaces as needed. 
4.3 Bug Detection 
In this phase, DSAC first detects possible SAC bugs, 
and then filters out repeated reports and false bugs. 
Firstly, the bug detector uses the hybrid flow analysis 
to check whether each extracted sleep-able kernel inter-
face is called in atomic context, which is implemented 
in HowToFunc in Figure 2. If so, a possible bug and its 
detailed code path to the sleep-able kernel interface call 
are recorded. To speed up analysis, we use the interme-
diate results to only check the buggy kernel modules. 
Secondly, the bug filter filters out repeated reports 
and false bugs. Finally, DSAC produces detailed reports 
for the found bugs (including code paths and source file 
names), so the user can locate and check the bugs. 
4.4 Recommended Patch Generation 
In this phase, the patch generator automatically gener-
ates recommended patches to help fix the bugs. Then, 
the user can use the detailed code paths found in the bug 
reports to write log messages, and finally submit these 
patches to kernel maintainers. 
5. Evaluation 
5.1 Experimental Setup 
To validate the effectiveness of DSAC, we first evaluate 
it on Linux drivers, which are typical kernel modules. 
To cover different kernel versions, we select an old 
version 3.17.2 (released in October 2014), and a new 
version 4.11.1 (released in May 2017). Then, to validate 
the generality of DSAC, we use it to check file systems 
and network modules in the Linux kernel. Finally, to 
validate the portability of DSAC, we run it in FreeBSD 
and NetBSD to check their kernel code. 
We run the experiments on a Lenovo x86-64 PC with 
four Intel i5-3470@3.20G processors and 4GB memory. 
We compile the code using Clang 3.2. We use the ker-
nel configuration allyesconfig to enable all drivers, file 
systems and network modules for the x86 architecture. 
To run DSAC, the user performs three steps. Firstly, 
the user configures DSAC for the checked OS kernel, 
by providing the names of spin-lock and -unlock func-
tions (such as spin_lock_irq and spin_unlock_irq for 
the Linux kernel), interrupt-handler-register functions 
(such as request_irq for the Linux kernel), and basic 
sleep-able kernel interfaces (such as schedule for the 
Linux kernel). Secondly, the user compiles the source 
code of the kernel modules and OS kernel using the 
kernel’s underlying Makefile and DSAC’s compiling 
script. As a result, DSAC produces sleep-able functions 
and intermediate results. Finally, the user executes 
DSAC’s bug-detecting script to detect bugs and gener-
ate recommended patches. The second and third steps 










































Figure 5: Overall architecture of DSAC. 
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5.2 Extracting Sleep-able Kernel Interfaces 
We first extract the sleep-able kernel interfaces that are 
called in atomic context of the drivers. Table 1 presents 
the results for Linux 3.17.2 and 4.11.1. We make the 
following observations: 
1) DSAC can scale to large code bases. It handles 7M 
and 9M source code lines from 8K and 11K source files. 
And the analysis is started from many entry basic blocks 
and many interrupt handler (INTR) functions. 
2) Our heuristics-based method can efficiently extract 
real sleep-able kernel interfaces that are called in atomic 
context of the analyzed drivers. In Linux 3.17.2 and 
4.11.1, 70 and 94 sleep-able kernel interfaces are re-
spectively identified from among 3104 and 3613 differ-
ent kernel interfaces (candidate functions) that are pos-
sibly called in atomic context. We manually check the 
kernel interfaces identified as sleep-able, and find that 
all of them can sleep at runtime. Over 97% of the can-
didate functions are automatically filtered out, thus the 
manual work of checking these functions is saved. 
3) Our code analysis is efficient. DSAC respectively 
spends around 108 and 129 minutes on handling 8K and 
11K driver source files, including the compilation time 
of these source files using the Clang compiler. Exclud-
ing compilation time, DSAC spends 61 and 74 minutes 
respectively, amounting to less than 0.44 seconds per 
source file. 
4) Many of the extracted sleep-able kernel interfaces 
are related to resource handling (such as allocation and 
release). The data in parentheses present the number of 
these kernel interfaces, which amount to more than 60% 
of all the sleep-able kernel interfaces. 
5.3 Detecting Bugs and Generating Patches 
Based on the above extracted sleep-able kernel interfac-
es, we use DSAC to perform bug detection and recom-
mend patches. Firstly, to validate whether DSAC can 
find known bugs, we use DSAC to check the drivers in 
Linux 3.17.2. We do not generate patches in this case, 
because this kernel version is very old. Secondly, to 
validate whether DSAC can find new bugs and recom-
mend patches to help fix them, we use DSAC to check 
the drivers in Linux 4.11.1. We count the bugs accord-
ing to the pair of entry and terminal basic blocks. To 
check results’ accuracy, we manually check all detected 
bugs to identify whether they are real bugs. Table 2 
shows the results. We have the following findings: 
1) Our path-check filtering method is effective in au-
tomatically filtering out repeated reports and false bugs. 
2) Of the 215 bugs reported by DSAC in the drivers 
of Linux 3.17.2, we have identified 200 as real bugs, 50 
of which have been fixed in Linux 4.11.1. By reading 
the messages in relevant Linux driver mailing lists, we 
find that kernel maintainers confirmed that these fixed 
bugs could cause serious problems, like system hangs. 
The results indicate DSAC can indeed find known bugs. 
3) Of the 340 bugs reported by DSAC in the drivers 
of Linux 4.11.1, we have identified 320 as real bugs. 
150 bugs are inherited from the legacy code in 3.17.2, 
and 170 bugs are introduced by new functionalities and 
new drivers. We have reported all the bugs that we 
identified as real to kernel maintainers. As of January 
2018, 209 bugs have been confirmed, and replies for the 
other bugs have not been received. The results indicate 
DSAC can indeed find new real bugs. 
4) DSAC can accurately find real bugs in our evaluat-
ed driver code. The false positive rates are respectively 
only 7.0% and 5.9% in the drivers of Linux 3.17.2 and 
4.11.1, based on our identification of real bugs. Review-
ing the driver source code, we find these false positives 
are mainly introduced by the fact that some invalid code 
paths are searched by our hybrid flow analysis and our 
path-check method does not filter them out. 
5) Few of the detected bugs are in interrupt handlers 
(7 bugs in 3.17.2, and 17 bugs in 4.11.1). Indeed, driver 
developers often write clear comments to mark the driv-
er functions that are called from an interrupt handler, to 
prevent calling sleep-able functions in these functions. 
6) DSAC automatically and successfully generates 43 
patches that it recommends to help fix 82 real bugs in 
Linux 4.11.1. Table 2 classifies the patches by the pat-
tern in Section 3.2.4 that is used. We manually review 
these patches, add appropriate descriptions, and then 
submit them to the relevant kernel maintainers. As of 
January 2018, 30 patches have been applied, noted in 
Table 1: Results of extracting sleep-able kernel interfaces. 
Description 3.17.2 4.11.1 
Code 
handling 
Handled bytecode files 3377 4396 
Source files (.c) 8321 11153 
Source code lines 7392K 9464K 
Hybrid flow 
analysis 
Entry basic blocks 32167 37770 
Handled INTR functions 578 673 
Heuristic 
extraction 
Recorded functions 3104 3613 
Sleep-able kernel interfaces 70 (51) 94 (63) 
Time usage 
Original compilation 47m21s 55m34s 
DSAC total 108m43s 129m58s 
DSAC pure 61m22s 74m22s 
 
 
Table 2: Detected bugs and generated patches in drivers. 
Description 3.17.2 4.11.1 
Detected bugs 
Repeated filtered 479630 629924 
False filtered 282 430 
Final detected 215 340 
Interrupt handling 7 17 
Real 200 320 
Patch generation 
P1 (replace the function) - 28 (18) 
P2 (replace the flag) - 15 (12) 
Total - 43 (30) 
Time usage 
Bug detection 6m31s 8m46s 
Patch generation - 1m02s 
Total 6m31s 9m48s 
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parentheses in Table 2. 2 patches were not directly ap-
plied as the maintainers wanted to fix the bugs in other 
ways (such as P3 and P4). There has been no reply yet 
for 11 patches. There are still 238 real bugs for which 
DSAC cannot recommend patches, as they do not match 
P1 or P2. Most of these bugs can be fixed using P3 or 
P4. But those patterns require more difficult changes, 
and DSAC is not currently able to automatically apply 
them. In general, the results indicate that DSAC can 
generate a number of correct patches to reduce the 
manual work of bug fixing. 
7) Bug detection and patch generation are efficient, 
requiring less than 10 minutes. The reasons include that 
intermediate results are used to reduce repeated analysis 
and our hybrid flow analysis is efficient. 
Reviewing the results, we find two interesting things. 
Firstly, most of the detected bugs involve multiple func-
tions. Indeed, driver developers may easily forget that 
the code is in atomic context across multiple function 
calls. Secondly, many of the detected bugs are related to 
resource allocation and release, because many extracted 
sleep-able functions relate to this issue. 
We also classify the 320 real bugs found by DSAC in 
Linux 4.11.1 drivers, according to driver class. Table 3 
shows the top results. We find that SCSI and network 
drivers share 58% of all bugs. 
Figure 6(a) shows a real bug detected by DSAC in the 
gma500 driver of Linux 4.11.1, which has been con-
firmed by the developer. The function psbfb_2d_submit 
first calls spin_lock_irqsave to acquire a spinlock (line 
115), and then it calls psb_2d_wait_available (line 119) 
that calls psb_spank in definition (line 91). The function 
psb_spank calls msleep (line 58) that can sleep. To help 
fix the bug, our pattern-based method recommends a 
patch that replaces msleep with mdelay (P1), and this 
patch has been applied by the kernel maintainer. Part of 
the DSAC’s report for this bug is listed above Table 3. 
5.4 Generality and Portability 
We use DSAC to check file systems and network mod-
ules in Linux 4.11.1. Then we run DSAC in FreeBSD 
11.0 and NetBSD 7.1 to check their kernel code. Table 
4 shows the results. We have the following findings: 
1) DSAC works normally when checking Linux file 
systems and network modules and other OS kernels. 
DSAC can handle their source code in a modest amount 
of time. It can extract real sleep-able kernel interfaces 
and filter out many repeated reports and false bugs. 
2) DSAC in total finds 81 real bugs out of the 88 de-
tected bugs. The false positive rate is thus 8.0%. The 
false positives are again due to searching invalid code 
paths. As of January 2018, 63 of these bugs have been 
confirmed by kernel developers. Figure 6(b) and (c) 
present two real SAC bugs found by DSAC in FreeBSD 
scsi_sa and NetBSD if_vte drivers. These bugs involve 
respectively a spinlock and an interrupt handler. 
3) DSAC in total generates 18 recommended patches 
to help fix 59 real bugs. We manually add appropriate 
descriptions and submit them to kernel maintainers. As 










(a) Linux gma500 driver                          (b) FreeBSD scsi_sa driver                               (c) NetBSD if_vte driver 
Figure 6: Examples of the real bugs detected by DSAC. 
 
FILE: linux-4.11.1/drivers/gpu/…/accel_2d.c 
50. static void psb_spank(…) { 
           …… 
  58.     msleep(1) //PATCH: msleep(1) ⇒ mdelay(1) 
           …… 
  67. } 
 
  82. static int psb_2d_wait_available(…) { 
           …… 
  91.     psb_spank(…); 
           …… 
  96. } 
 
107. static int psbfb_2d_submit(…) { 
…… 
115.     spin_lock_irqsave(…); 
…… 
119.     ret = psb_2d_wait_available(…); 
…… 
130.     spin_unlock_irqrestore(…); 




204. #define cam_perigh_lock(…)   mtx_lock(…) 
205. #define cam_perigh_unlock(…)   mtx_unlock(…) 
 
1498. static int saioctl(…) { 
…… 
1680.     cam_periph_lock(…)  /* acquire spinlock */ 
…… 
1683.     error = saxtget(…); 
…… 




4377. static int saextget(…) { 
…… 
4444.     tmpstr2 = malloc(ts_len, M_SCSISA, 
4445.                                           M_WAITOK); 
                // PATCH: M_WAITOK ⇒ M_NOWAIT 
…… 




948. /* Interrupt handler */ 
949. static int vte_intr(…) { 
…… 




1045. static int vte_newbuff(…) { 
…… 
1056.     if (bus_dmamap_load_mbuf(sc->vte_dmatag, 
1057.             sc->vte_cdata.vte_rx_sparemap, m, 0)); 
// PATCH: 0 ⇒ BUS_DMA_NOWAIT 
…… 
1083.     return 0; 
1084. } 
 
1086. static void vte_rxeof(…) { 
…… 
1118.     vte_newbuff(…); 
…… 
1176. } 
********** BUG  ********** 
Sleep-able function: msleep 
[FUNC] psb_spank (drivers/gpu/…/accel_2d.c: LINE 58) 
[FUNC] psb_2d_wait_available (drivers/gpu/…/accel_2d.c: LINE 91) 
…… 
[FUNC] psbfb_2d_submit (drivers/gpu/…/accel_2d.c: LINE 119) 
…… 
[FUNC] psbfb_2d_submit (drivers/gpu/…/accel_2d.c: LINE 115) 
 
Table 4: Results of Linux fs and net, FreeBSD and NetBSD. 
Description fs & net FreeBSD NetBSD 
Code  
handling 
Handled bytecode files 925 632 710 
Source files 2506 1615 1977 
Source code lines 2013K 1759K 1896K 
Function 
extraction 
Recorded functions 1927 582 304 
Sleep-able kernel interfaces 34 12 10 
Bugs & 
patches 
Filtered bugs 682081 508 2414 
Final detected bugs 42 39 7 
Real bugs 39 35 (26) 7 (7) 
Generated patches 5 10 3 
Pure time usages 32m45s 49m12s 43m38s 
 
Table 3: Bug distribution according to driver class. 
Driver Class scsi network staging gpio others 
Bugs 103 (32%) 84 (26%) 62 (19%) 12 (4%) 59 (18%) 
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Reviewing the results, we find two interesting things. 
Firstly, compared to the Linux kernel, fewer SAC bugs 
are detected in FreeBSD and NetBSD. The main reason 
is that in FreeBSD and NetBSD, many kernel interfaces 
that can sleep are carefully designed to avoid SAC bugs. 
For example, the FreeBSD msleep function takes the 
held spinlock as an argument and unlocks the spinlock 
before actually sleeping and then locks it again. Second-
ly, in FreeBSD and NetBSD, most of the detected bugs 
are in drivers, as shown in the parentheses on “Real 
bugs” line of Table 4. It shows that drivers remain a 
significant cause of system failures [39]. 
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
DSAC performs flow-insensitive analysis to reduce time 
usage in specific cases when doing so is expected to not 
affect accuracy, and also maintains a lock stack to accu-
rately identify the code in atomic context. To show the 
value of these two techniques, we modify DSAC to re-
move each of them, and evaluate each modified tool on 
a typical SCSI driver fnic (drivers/scsi/fnic/) of Linux 
4.11.1. Original DSAC checks the driver in three se-
conds, and finds two real confirmed SAC bugs. 
Flow-insensitive analysis. We use a full flow-sensitive 
analysis rather than the hybrid flow analysis. It finds the 
two SAC bugs too, but it spends two minutes, which is 
much longer than original DSAC. 
Lock stack. We only keep a single bit indicating wheth-
er a lock is held rather than the lock stack during analy-
sis. It also spends three seconds, but does not find any 
bugs. Indeed, the two bugs exist when two spinlocks are 
held and just one spinlock has been released, thus keep-
ing a single bit cannot identify this atomic context. 
5.6 Summary of Results 
Our experiments show three significant results of using 
DSAC on the Linux, FreeBSD and NetBSD kernels: 
 401 new real bugs are found, of which 272 have 
been confirmed by kernel developers. 
 Only 27 reports are false positives. Thus the overall 
false positive rate of bug detection is only 6.3%. 
 61 recommended patches are generated, of which 
43 have been applied by kernel maintainers. 
6. Comparison to Previous Approaches 
Several previous approaches [2, 9, 16, 34] have consid-
ered SAC bugs. Among them, we select the BlockLock 
checker [34] to make a detailed comparison. We select 
this approach because: (1) It is a state-of-the-art tool to 
detect SAC bugs in the Linux kernel. (2) It is open-
source and its bug reports are available [54]. In design, 
DSAC has some key improvements over BlockLock: 
Code analysis. BlockLock only uses one bit of context 
information to check if a lock is held, so it may not ac-
curately identify the code in atomic context when multi-
ple locks are taken but only some of them are released. 
DSAC maintains a complete lock stack and performs 
context-sensitive analysis, thus it can accurately detect 
all code in atomic context. BlockLock is also not sensi-
tive to the module Makefile, and thus may choose the 
wrong definition when unfolding a function call if the 
called function has multiple definitions. DSAC uses the 
module Makefile to accurately identify the definition of 
each function. And DSAC can detect SAC bugs in inter-
rupt handlers and involving sleeping operations other 
than a call to an allocation function with GFP_KERNEL, 
which are not considered by BlockLock. 
Sleep-able function extraction. BlockLock regards all 
functions called in the kernel as candidate functions to 
extract sleep-able functions. This strategy entails check-
ing each function in the kernel inter-procedurally, so it 
may require much time. DSAC only treats the kernel 
interfaces possibly called in atomic context of the ana-
lyzed kernel module(s) as candidate functions, and skips 
the other functions not called in atomic context. 
False bug filtering. BlockLock does not consider varia-
ble value information to validate path conditions, which 
may cause a number of false positives. DSAC checks 
the detailed code path of each possible bug, and filters 
out false bugs using useful and common semantic in-
formation for variables in atomic context. 
Patch generation. BlockLock only reports bugs, but it 
does not help fix the bugs. DSAC uses common fixing 
patterns to generate recommended patches to help fix 
the bugs. The produced code paths of the bugs are also 
useful to help the user write log messages in the patches. 
We also compare the results of BlockLock and DSAC, 
with two steps. Firstly, we download the bug reports of 
BlockLock on Linux 2.6.33 drivers, and get 49 reported 
bugs. We select the bugs related to the x86 architecture 
based on driver Kconfig files. We get 31 reported SAC 
bugs (25 real bugs and 6 false bugs). Secondly, we use 
DSAC to check the Linux 2.6.33 driver source code. 
We use the kernel configuration allyesconfig to enable 
all drivers for the x86 architecture. DSAC reports 42 
sleep-able kernel interfaces and 228 reported SAC bugs. 
We manually check the bugs and find that 208 are real. 
By manually comparing the bug reports shows: (1) 53 
real bugs reported by DSAC are equivalent to 23 real 
bugs reported by BlockLock. DSAC reports more bugs 
because it detects sleep-able kernel interfaces, while 
BlockLock detects sleep-able functions. Thus, if a func-
tion defined in the kernel module calls several sleep-
able kernel interfaces in atomic context, DSAC reports 
all these kernel interfaces, while BlockLock only reports 
this function. The two remaining real bugs reported by 
BlockLock are missed by DSAC, as Clang-3.2 cannot 
successfully compile the related driver source code. (2) 
596    2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference USENIX Association
 
 
DSAC filters out all false bugs reported by BlockLock. 
(3) DSAC reports 155 real bugs missed by BlockLock. 
Most of these bugs involve multiple source files, and 
BlockLock cannot handle them very precisely. And 18 
bugs are related to interrupt handling, which is not con-
sidered by BlockLock. (4) The false positive rate of 
DSAC is 8.8%, which is lower than that of BlockLock. 
However, compared to BlockLock, an important limi-
tation of DSAC is that its results are specific to a single 
kernel configuration. BlockLock is based on Coccinelle 
[33], which does not compile the source code. Thus it 
can conveniently check all source files without any ker-
nel configuration. DSAC is based on LLVM, which 
compiles the source code with a selected kernel config-
uration. Thus, the 18 bugs found by BlockLock for non-
x86 architectures are missed by DSAC. 
7. Limitations and Future Work 
DSAC still has some limitations. Firstly, DSAC analyz-
es LLVM bytecode in which macros are expanded, thus 
the user needs to configure DSAC in terms of expanded 
versions of the functions and constants that are defined 
by macros. We plan to introduce source code infor-
mation to address this issue. Secondly, DSAC cannot 
handle function pointers. We plan to use alias analysis 
[22, 46] to analyze them. Thirdly, as is typical for static 
analysis, the path-check method cannot filter out all 
invalid code paths produced by the hybrid flow analysis, 
which can introduce false positives. We plan to improve 
our path-check method by checking path conditions 
more accurately. Finally, the bug-fixing patterns P3 and 
P4 need to be supported, e.g., we plan to add the analy-
sis for other kinds of locks to support P4. 
8. Related Work 
8.1 Detecting Concurrency Bugs 
Many approaches [7, 14, 19, 28, 32, 38, 42, 43] have 
been proposed to detect concurrency bugs in user-mode 
applications. Some of them [7, 19, 42] use dynamic 
analysis to collect and analyze runtime information to 
detect concurrency bugs. But the code coverage of dy-
namic analysis is limited by test cases. Others [14, 32, 
38, 43] use static analysis to cover more code without 
running the tested programs. But static analysis often 
introduces false positives. Some approaches [8, 26, 28] 
combine static and dynamic analysis to achieve higher 
code coverage with fewer false positives. Even though 
DSAC uses static analysis, it also exploits complemen-
tary information such as semantic information for varia-
bles to check code paths to filter out false positives. 
To improve OS reliability, some approaches [13, 15, 
17, 18, 40, 41, 44] detect some kinds of concurrency 
bugs like data races, but they do not detect SAC bugs. 
Several approaches [2, 9, 16, 34, 53] can detect com-
mon kinds of OS kernel bugs, including SAC bugs. But 
they do not specifically target SAC bugs, thus they may 
miss many real bugs or report many of false positives. 
For example, BlockLock [34] has an overall false posi-
tive rate of 20%, while DSAC has a lower one of 6.3%, 
and it also misses some real bugs found by DSAC. 
8.2 Checking API Rules 
Checking API rules is a promising way of finding deep 
and semantic bugs in the OS kernel. Some approaches 
[3, 5, 30, 31] use specified and known API rules to stat-
ically or dynamically detect API misuses. For example, 
with known paired reference count management func-
tions, RID [30] uses a summary-based inter-procedural 
analysis to detect reference counting bugs. To find im-
plicit API rules, some approaches [4, 23, 24, 27, 37, 45, 
47] do specification mining by analyzing source code 
[24, 27, 37, 47] or execution traces [4, 23, 45], and then 
use the mined API rules to detect violations. 
Most of these approaches focus on the temporal rules 
of common API usages, such as resource acquiring and 
releasing pairs [37, 45] and error handling patterns [4, 
24], but these approaches have not targeted SAC bugs. 
8.3 Improving Kernel Module Architecture 
To prevent concurrency bugs, several improved kernel 
module architectures have been proposed, typically for 
device drivers. The active driver architecture [1, 36] 
runs each driver in a separate thread, which can serial-
ize access to the driver and eliminate the possibility of 
concurrency bugs. In this way, the driver works serially 
and does not need to use locks, thus many common 
concurrency bugs will never occur. The user-mode de-
vice-driver architecture [20, 25, 35] runs each driver in 
a separate user-mode process. This architecture protects 
the OS kernel against crashes caused by driver code. 
These approaches have a main limitation, namely that 
the driver code must be manually rewritten. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed DSAC, a static ap-
proach, to effectively detect SAC bugs and automatical-
ly recommend patches to help fix them. DSAC uses four 
key techniques: (1) a hybrid flow analysis to identify the 
code in atomic context; (2) a heuristics-based method to 
extract sleep-able kernel interfaces; (3) a path-check 
method to filter out repeated reports and false bugs; (4) 
a pattern-based method to automatically generate rec-
ommended patches to help fix the bugs. We have used 
DSAC to check the kernel code of Linux, FreeBSD and 
NetBSD, and find 401 new real bugs. As of January 
2018, 272 of them have been confirmed, and 43 of the 
patches generated by DSAC have been applied. 




[1] S. Amani, P. Chubb, A. F. Donaldson, A. Legg, K. C. 
Ong, L. Ryzhyk, and Y. Zhu. Automatic verification of 
active device drivers. In ACM SIGOPS Operating System 
Review, volume 48, pages 106-118, 2014. 
[2] Z. Anderson, E. Brewer, J. Condit, R. Ennals, D. Gay, M. 
Harren, G. C. Necula, and F. Zhou. Beyond bug-finding: 
sound program analysis for Linux. In Proceedings of the 
11th International Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating 
Systems (HotOS), pages 1-6, 2007. 
[3] J. J. Bai, H. Q. Liu, Y. P. Wang, and S. M. Hu. Runtime 
checking for paired functions in device drivers. In Pro-
ceedings of the 21st Asia-Pacific Software Engineering 
Conference (APSEC), pages 407-414, 2014. 
[4] J. J. Bai, Y. P. Wang, H. Q. Liu, and S. M. Hu. Mining 
and checking paired functions in device drivers using 
characteristics fault injection. In Information and Soft-
ware Technology, volume 73, pages 122-133, 2016. 
[5] T. Ball, E. Bounimova, B. Cook, V. Levin, J. Lichten-
berg, C. McGarvey, B. Ondrusek, S. K. Rajamani, and A. 
Ustuner. Thorough static analysis of device drivers. In 
Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Com-
puter Systems (EuroSys), pages 73-85, 2006. 
[6] C. Cadar, D. Dunbar, and D. Engler. KLEE: unassisted 
and automatic generation of high-coverage tests for com-
plex systems programs. In Proceedings of the 8th Inter-
national Conference on Operating Systems Design and 
Implementation (OSDI), pages 209-224, 2008. 
[7] Y. Cai, J. Zhang, L. Cao, and J. Liu. A deployable sam-
pling strategy for data race detection. In Proceedings of 
the 24th International Symposium on Foundations of 
Software Engineering (FSE), pages 810-821, 2016. 
[8] L. Chew, and D. Lie. Kivati: fast detection and preven-
tion of atomic violations. In Proceedings of 5th Europe-
an Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), pages 
307-320, 2010. 
[9] A. Chou, J. Yang, B. Chelf, S. Hallem, and D. Engler. 
An empirical study of operating systems errors. In Pro-
ceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Oper-
ating Systems Principles (SOSP), pages 73-88, 2001. 
[10] Jonathan Corbet. Atomic context and kernel API design. 
In Linux Weekly News (LWN.net), 2008. 
https://lwn.net/Articles/274695/. 
[11] J. Corbet, A. Rubini, and G. K. Hartman. Spinlocks and 
atomic context. In Linux Device Drivers, 3rd edition, 
pages 118-119, 2005. 
[12] D. Cotroneo, R. Natella, and S. Russo. Assessment and 
improvement of hang detection in the Linux operating 
system. In Proceedings of the 28th International Sympo-
sium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS), pages 
288-294, 2009. 
[13] P. Deligiannis, A. F. Donaldson, and Z. Rakamaric. Fast 
and precise symbolic analysis of concurrency bugs in de-
vice drivers. In Proceedings of the 30th International 
Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE), 
pages 166-177, 2015. 
[14] J. Deshmukh, E. A. Emerson, and S. Sankaranarayanan. 
Symbolic deadlock analysis in concurrent libraries and 
their clients. In Proceedings of the 24th International 
Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE), 
pages 480-491, 2009. 
[15] D. Engler, and K. Ashcraft. RacerX: effective, static de-
tection of race conditions and deadlocks. In Proceedings 
of the 19th International Symposium on Operating Sys-
tems Principles (SOSP), pages 237-252, 2003. 
[16] D. Engler, B. Chelf, A. Chou, and S. Hallem. Checking 
system rules using system-specific, programmer-written 
compiler extensions. In Proceedings of the 4th Interna-
tional Conference on Operating Systems Design and Im-
plementation (OSDI), pages 1-16, 2000. 
[17] J. Erickson, M. Musuvathi, S. Burckhardt, and K. Olyn-
yk. Effective data-race detection for the kernel. In Pro-
ceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operat-
ing Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), pages 
151-162, 2010. 
[18] P. Fonseca, R. Rodrigues, and B. B. Brandenburg. SKI: 
exposing kernel concurrency bugs through systematic 
schedule exploration. In Proceedings of the 11th Interna-
tional Conference on Operating Systems Design and Im-
plementation (OSDI), pages 415-431, 2014. 
[19] P. Fonseca, C. Li, and R. Rodrigues. Finding complex 
concurrency bugs in large multi-threaded applications. In 
Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Com-
puter Systems (EuroSys), pages 215-228, 2011. 
[20] V. Ganapathy, M. J. Renzelmann, A. Balakrishnan, M. 
M. Swift, and S. Jha. The design and implementation of 
microdrivers. In Proceedings of the 13th International 
Conference on Architectural Support for Programming 
Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS), pages 
168-178, 2008. 
[21] Z. Gu, E. T. Barr, D. J. Hamilton, and Z. Su. Has the bug 
really been fixed? In Proceedings of the 32nd Interna-
tional Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), pag-
es 55-64, 2010. 
[22] V. Kahlon. Bootstrapping: a technique for scalable flow 
and context-sensitive pointer alias analysis. In Proceed-
ings of the 29th International Conference on Program-
ming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI), 
pages 249-259, 2008. 
[23] C. LaRosa, L. Xiong, and K. Mandelberg. Frequent pat-
tern mining for kernel trace data. In Proceedings of the 
23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing 
(SAC), pages 880-885, 2008. 
[24] J. Lawall, J. Brunel, N. Palix, R. R. Hansen, H. Stuart, 
and G. Muller. WYSIWIB: a declarative approach to 
finding API protocols and bugs in Linux code. In Pro-
ceedings of the 39th International Conference on Depen-
dable Systems and Networks (DSN), pages 43-53, 2009. 
[25] B. Leslie, P. Chubb, N. Fitzroy-Dale, S. Götz, C. Gray, L. 
Macpherson, D. Potts, Y. T. Shen, K. Elphinstone, and G. 
Heiser. User-level device drivers: achieved performance. 
In Journal of Computer Science and Technology (JCST), 
volume 20, issue 5, pages 654-664, 2005. 
598    2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference USENIX Association
 
 
[26] Q. Li, Y. Jiang, T. Gu, C. Xu, J. Ma, X. Ma, and J. Lu. 
Effectively manifesting concurrency bugs in Android 
apps. In Proceedings of the 23rd Asia-Pacific Software 
Engineering Conference (APSEC), pages 209-216, 2016. 
[27] Z. Li, and Y. Zhou. PR-Miner: automatically extracting 
implicit programming rules and detecting violations in 
large software code. In Proceedings of the 13th Interna-
tional Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineer-
ing (FSE), pages 306-315, 2005. 
[28] H. Liu, G. Li, J. F. Lukman, J. Li, S. Lu, H. S. Gunawi, 
and C. Tian. DCatch: automatically detecting distributed 
concurrency bugs in cloud systems. In Proceedings of 
the 22nd International Conference on Architectural Sup-
port for Programming Languages and Operating Sys-
tems (ASPLOS), pages 677-691, 2017. 
[29] R. Love. Interrupt context. In Linux Kernel Development, 
3rd edition, page 122, 2010. 
[30] J. Mao, Y. Chen, Q. Xiao, and Y. Shi. RID: finding ref-
erence count bugs with inconsistent path pair checking. 
In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on 
Architectural Support for Programming Languages and 
Operating Systems (ASPLOS), pages 531-544, 2016. 
[31] C. Min, S. Kashyap, B. Lee, C. Song, T. Kim. Cross-
checking semantic correctness: the case of finding file 
system bugs. In Proceedings of the 25th Symposium on 
Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), pages 361-377, 
2015. 
[32] M. Naik, A. Aiken, and J. Whaley. Effective static race 
detection for Java. In Proceedings of the 27th Interna-
tional Conference on Programming Language Design 
and Implementation (PLDI), pages 308-319, 2006. 
[33] Y. Padioleau, J. Lawall, R. R. Hansen, and G. Muller. 
Documenting and automating collateral evolutions in 
Linux device drivers. In Proceedings of the 3rd Europe-
an Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), pages 
247-260, 2008. 
[34] N. Palix, G. Thomas, S. Saha, C. Calvès, G. Muller, and 
J. Lawall. Faults in Linux 2.6. In ACM Transactions on 
Computer Systems (TOCS), volume 32, issue 2, pages 
4:1-4:40, 2014. 
[35] M. J. Renzelmann, and M. M. Swift. Decaf: moving de-
vice drivers to a modern language. In Proceedings of the 
2009 Conference on USENIX Annual Technical Confer-
ence (USENIX ATC), pages 1-14, 2009. 
[36] L. Ryzhyk, Y. Zhu, and G. Heiser. The case for active 
device drivers. In Proceedings of the 1st Aisa-Pacific 
Workshop on Systems (APSys), pages 25-30, 2010. 
[37] S. Saha, J. P. Lozi, G. Thomas, J. Lawall, and G. Muller. 
Hector: detecting resource-release omission faults in er-
ror-handling code for systems software. In Proceedings 
of the 43rd International Conference on Dependable 
Systems and Networks (DSN), pages 1-12, 2013. 
[38] A. Santhiar, and A. Kanade. Static deadlock detection for 
asynchronous C# programs. In Proceedings of the 38th 
International Conference on Programming Language 
Design and Implementation (PLDI), pages 292-305, 2017. 
[39] M. M. Swift, B. N. Bershad, and H. M. Levy. Improving 
the reliability of commodity operating systems. In Pro-
ceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Oper-
ating Systems Principles (SOSP), pages 207-222, 2003. 
[40] L. Tan, Y. Zhou, and Y. Padioleau. aComment: mining 
annotations from comments and code to detect interrupt 
related concurrency bugs. In Proceedings of the 33rd In-
ternational Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), 
pages 11-20, 2011. 
[41] V. Vojdani, K. Apinis, V. Rõtov, H. Seidl, V. Vene, and 
R. Vogler. Static race detection for device drivers: the 
Goblint approach. In Proceedings of the 31st Interna-
tional Conference on Automated Software Engineering 
(ASE), pages 391-402, 2016. 
[42] D. Weeratunge, X. Zhang, W. N. Sumner, and S. Jagan-
nathan. Analyzing concurrency bugs using dual slicing. 
In Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on 
Software Testing and Analysis (ISSTA), pages 253-264, 
2010. 
[43] A. Williams, W. Thies, and M. D. Ernst. Static deadlock 
detection for Java libraries. In Proceedings of the 19th 
European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming 
(ECOOP), pages 602-629, 2005. 
[44] T. Witkowski, N. Blanc, D. Kroening, and G. Weissen-
bacher. Model checking concurrent Linux device drivers. 
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on 
Automated Software Engineering (ASE), pages 501-504. 
2007. 
[45] J. Yang, D. Evans, D. Bhardwaj, T. Bhat, and M. Das. 
Perracotta: mining temporal API rules from imperfect 
traces. In Proceedings of 28th International Conference 
on Software Engineering (ICSE), pages 282-291, 2006. 
[46] H. Yu, J. Xue, W. Huo, X. Feng, and Z. Zhang. Level by 
level: making flow- and context-sensitive pointer analy-
sis scalable for millions of lines of code. In Proceedings 
of the 8th International Symposium on Code Generation 
and Optimization (CGO), pages 218-229, 2010. 
[47] I. Yun, C. Min, X. Si, Y. Jiang, T. Kim, and M. Naik. 
APISan: sanitizing API usages through semantic cross-
checking. In Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security 
Symposium, pages 363-378, 2016. 
[48] Y. Zhu, Y. Li, J. Xue, T. Tan, J. Shi, Y. Shen, and C. Ma. 
What is system hang and how to handle it. In Proceed-
ings of the 23rd International Symposium on Software 
Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), pages 141-150, 2012. 
[49] Clang compiler. http://clang.llvm.org/. 
[50] Linux kernel document for memory allocation. 
https://www.kernel.org/doc/htmldocs/kernel-api/API-
kmalloc.html. 
[51] LLVM Compiler Infrastructure. https://llvm.org/. 
[52] MYSQL database. https://www.mysql.com/. 
[53] Syzkaller tool. https://github.com/google/syzkaller/. 
[54] Website for “Faults in Linux: Ten years later”.  
http://faultlinux.lip6.fr/. 
USENIX Association 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference    599
